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A bill of ladirir is an instrument well known in coin-
mercial transactions, arid its character and effect have
been fully defined by juaicial decisions. It is the
same the world over, though the rules arid doctrines ap-
plicable thereto differ in the various jurisdictions.
At first a bill of lading was only used or issued in the
carriage of goods aboard ship; but at the present day
they are issued by any common carrier of goods. it has
been well defined as, "A written acknowiedgment by a rep-
resentative of a common carrier that he has received cer-
tain goods, to be carried upon certain terms, and to be
delivered to a person specified." It is an instrument
of a twofold character, being both a receipt and a con-
tract. As a receipt, it is a recital that certain goods,
naming and describing them, have been received by a per-
son named by the carrier. As a contract, it is an
agreement to take those goods to a certain place, to a
person therein named, upon certain terms which are there-
in set forth. As between the immediate parties to the
bill, and in so far as it is a receipt for the goods, de-
fining their quantity, quality, etc., it is open to ex-
planation and contradiction by parol evidence, or other-
wise. To preclude the admission of such evidence, the
language of the bill would have to be very clear and ex-
plicit, because it cannot be treated as a stipulated con-
tract, but simply as a receipt. But, although as a re-
ceipt, the bill is open to,explanation by parol evidence,
it is :nevertheless presumptive evidence of the facts
therein stated, and it is a very difficult thing for a
company or common carrier to convince a jury that the
facts are otherwise than in the written instrument. But
sometimes it is more than presumptive evidence: it may be
and is conclusive as~against third parties who are bona
fide holders for value.
As a contract, the bill of lading is subject to the
same general rules which govern written contracts, and
hence cannot be varied by parol evidence.
In the hands of the holder, the bill of lading is
evidence of ownership, special or general, of the proper-
ty mentioned therein, and of the right to receive such
property at the place of delivery.
Any common carrier, whether by land or water, or its
representative, can issue a bill of lading; but in the
absence of any contract or custom requiring them so to do,
railroad companies are not under legal obligations to
give them; nor is the consignor, by law, required to get
one for the benefit of the consignee; but carriers gener-
ally give them upon request and their freight agents are
authorized to sign arid issue them. The signature of the
carrier is necessary to bind him, but the consignor's
signature, without that ofl the carrier, is sufficient to
vest in persons to whom the bill is delivered, the right
of property in the goods, as consignee. Yet an instru-
ment so signed by the consignor is riot, strictly speaking,
a bill of lading.
Bills of lading are generally issued in triplicate,
one being given to the carrier, one sent to the consignee,
and one retained by the consignor; but this is not always
the case. There may be four bills, or there may be but
a single one. If several bills are issued, each, as to
the holder, is a contract in itself, but between the car-
rier and the owner, there is but one contract. So, if
the several bills are indorsed to different persons, and
any competition arises over the possession of the goods,
the equities being equal, the property passes by the bill
first indorsed. For the rule is well settled that when
the same goods are sold to different persons by equally
valid conveyances the one who first lawfully obtains
possession of the goods has priority.
A bill of lading may be drawn to the order of the
consignor or shipper, or to his agent, or to a consignee
named. The most common practice is to issue the bill to
the consignee or order, yet it is frequently issued to
the consignor or assigns, and sometimes even to bearer.
The bill should contain the quantity and marks of
the goods, together with the names of the consignor, the
consignee, and the carrier; the places of departure and
discharge, and the price of the freight. Sometimes it
contains other recitals, as of the condition of the goods
as delivered to the carrier, the exemption from liability,
and others, the effect of which will be considered under
another head.
Thus we have seen that a bill of lading is both a
receipt and a contract. It represents the goods them-
selves, anid, while they are in transit, is a symbol of
the goods. It is a mere chose in action, governed in the
main by the same rules regulating other choses in action.
It is issued by the carrier or its duly authorized agent.
And here the question arises as to whether the authority
conferred upon the agent to issue bills of lading is such
as to render the carrier liable on bills issued for goods
that have never been received by the carrier, or its
agent. This question was determined in England in 1851
to the effect that the general usage gives notice to all
people that the authority of the agent to give bills of
lading is limited to such goods as have been delivered
for carriage; and a party taking a bill of lading, either
originally or by endorsement, for goods which have never
been so delivered, is bound to show some particular au-
thority given to the agent to sign it. The agent is not
to be considered as agent of the owner to the extent that
he can render the latter responsible to one who has made
advances upon the faith of the bill of lading so signed.
And the Supreme Court of the United States, following the
English doctrine as above stated, considers a bill of
lading as a contract to carry and deliver certain goods.
Now, if no goods are actually received, there can be no
valid contract to carry and deliver. The receipt Qf the
goods lies at the foundation of the contract. Before L
the power to make and deliver a bill of lading can arise,
some person must ship goods. Only then can there be a
shipper, and only then can there be goods shipped. But
this must not be taken to mean that the goods must be
actually placed aboard the carrier. if they come within
the control and custody of the carrier or its agents, the
contract of carriage has commenced, and the evidence of
it in the form of a bill of lading will be binding. But
without such delivery, there is no contract of carrying,
and the agents of the carrier have no authority to make
one. The questioA is one of pure agency, and the courts
hold that in issuing bills of lading for goods not re-
ceived, the agent acts without authority.
This seems to be the holding of the courts of most
of the States, but the Court of.Appeals of New York has
reached an exact opposite conclusion from the same state-
merit of facts. This ruling is based on the ground that,
when confidence has been reposed in an agent, and an ap-
parent authority conferred upon him, the principal must
suffer from an actual exercise of authority, not exceed-:
ing the appearance of that which is granted. Whence.one
of two innocent persons must suffer in such a case, that
person must bear the loss, who reposed the confidence.
The agent having power to issue bills of lading direct to
the consignee for goods actually in the possession of the
carrier, and bills issued for goods received being in no
ways distinguishable in form from those usually and reg-
ularly employed, he must be considered as having the nec-
essary authority, as to persons acting in good faith.
It seems to be a well settled doctrine of the law of"
agency in this State, that, where the principal has
clothed the agent with power to do an act, upon the ex-
istence of some extrinsic fact, necessarily and peculiar-
ly within the knowledge of the agent, and of the exis-
tence of which, the act of executing the power is itself
a representation, a third person dealing with such agent
in entire good faith, pursuant to the apparent power, may
rely upon the representations, and the principal is es-
topped from denying its truth to his prejudice. Bills
of lading are issued with the expectation that they will
be acted upon by banks and other persons, 'in business
transactions. Surely, then, the carrier cannot complain
if the bills accomplish the purpose for which they were
designed. The representations in the bill are made to
any person, who, in the courseeof business, may see fit
to make advances on the faith of them. There is thus
present every element necessary to constitute ar estoppel
*in pais"::a representation made with the knowledge that
it may be acted upon, arid a subsequent action upon the
faith of it, and to such an extent that it would injure
the person so acting, if the representations were not
made good, It is now well settled that fraud is not a
necessary element to estoppel "in pais".
Thus we have two distinct arid opposing conclusions
from the same circumstances and facts; both well reasoned,
both sound law. It must be left to the jurisdiction uri-
der which the case arises to determine which doctrine
shall govern and control that particular case.
The usual method of transfering a bill of lading is
by endorsement arid delivery, ur, if it is made out to
bearer, by a mere delivery. But there must be a delivery
of the bill in either case, as the bill represents the
goods and operates as a symbolical delivery of them.
When the bill is made out to the consignee, or the
ownership of the goods is in him, he, strietly speaking,
is the only person who can pass the legal title to the
goods by an endorsement of the bill. But when the con-
signor is the owner of the goods, or the bill is made out
to his order, or he retains possession of the bill, he
may transfer it to a bona fide holder and pass the title
to the goods. But a bill of lading cannot pass the ti-
tle by its unaided operation, although it may serve as
evidence of a sale, or confer or operate as a symbolical
delivery of possession. Thus, when goods which have
been shipped, are sold and the bill of lading endorsed to
the vendee or consignee, the title passes by the sale and
riot by the endorsement, which, if withheld, would simply
indicate that the consignor meant to retain a hold or
lien upon the cargo, as security for the price. And for
a like reason, an endorsement of the bill to the vendee,
will riot preclude the vendor from stopping the goods in
transitu, or rescinding the contract on the ground Qf
fraud, for as the possession thus conferred is construc-
tive or fictitious,it does not vary the case as between
the original parties who know the truth and can shape
their conduct accordingly. When, however, third parties
intervene and give value on the faith of the apparent .
ownership created by the possession of the goods, or the
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bill of lading, the circumstances are no longer the sam
and it will be too late to reclaim the goods or set aside
the sale. Hence a sale by the vendee attended by an
endorsement of the bill of lading, will preclude the
right of *stoppage in transitu": not because the endorse-
ment is requisite to pass the title, but it places the
purchaser in the same position as if the sale had been
perfected by delivery. Delivery is essential to the
completion of a sale as against third parties, and for
some purposes even between the original parties; but when
an actual delivery is impossible, it may be made symboli-
cally by means best fitted to prevent fraud and give cer-
tainty to the transaction. When the goods sold are at
sea or in transit, an endorsement of the bill of lading
is the proper substitute for an actual delivery, becauseo
such an endorsement is the mode usually adopted among
merchants, and most likely to give notice of sale to
third parties.
If the bill retained by the consignor is transferred,
the transferee acquires good title as against the con-
signee to the extent of his claim, and holds the surplus,
if any after sale, in trust for the consignee. But, if
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since the transfer by the consignor, the consignee has
endorsed his bill to a bona fide holder for value, such
holder has a title superior to that of the transferee of
the consignor. Until such a transfer or endorsement has
been made, the consignee has no right or title hostile to
that of the transferee of the consignor, and if, in any
way, he gets possession oS the property and refuses to
give up the same, or account for the proceeds or any part
thereof, he may be held liable/for conversion.
The principal effect of a transfer of a bill of la-
ding to a bona fide holder for value by the consignee, is
to defeat the right of the consignor to stop the goods in
transit. And right here we will briefly set out the
doctrine of "stoppage in transitu".
This right of stopping goods in transitu is founded
wholly on equitable principles, which have been adopted
in courts of law. It cannot be called a lien, as a lien
exists only when the goods are in the possession of the
person claiming that lien. It is an equitable right
which the vendor has to reclaim and retake the goods
shipped before they have reached the hands of the consign-
ee, who has become insolvent, or before the latter has
12.
endorsed the bill of lading to a bona fide holder for
value. Strictly speaking, this right exists only be-
tween vendor and vendee, for if the goods are con igned
to an agent, any subsequent change of purpose or desti-
nation is, in fact, a revocation of the authority con-
ferred on that agent, aria not a stoppage in transitu.
Yet it is not necessary that the consignor,,in order to
support this right, should be the owner of the goods, or
have purchased them on his own account. Although acting
as an agent, for a commissicn, and with the view of pay-
ing for them ultimately with funds derived from the con-
signee, he may still exercise the right of stoppage as a
means of obtaining- payment or security for the sum ad-
vanced. The consignee must be insolvent before the
right can be exercised.
As the terms imply, the right of stopping goods in
transitu ceases as soon as the goods are in the possess-
ion of the consignee. And, if the consignee, before the
goods reach him, endorses his bill to a bona fide holder
for value, the right of stoppage in transitu is defeated.
But a sale of goods not yet received by the vendee, with-
out a transfer of the bill of lading, will not divest
13.
this right. The transferkof the bill, to defeat this
right, must be to a bona fide holder for value. And the
question at once arises as to who is a bona fide holder
for value.of a bill of lading.
As a general rule, the same rules will govern this
question in regard to bills of lading as govern in the
law of bills and notes, i. e. Any person who takes the
paper without notice of any equities existing between the
original parties; and in the ordinary course of business,
giving value for the same, is a bona fide holder for
value. This includes one who loans or advances money on
the faith of the endorsement of a bill of lading. The
transfer must be for value, and as to whether a transfer
as security for an antecedent debt constitutes the holder
one for value, the courts have held both ways.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held, in
regard to bills and notes, that such a holder is a bona
fide holder for value; while the Court of Appeals of New
York holds the exact opposite, i. e. that he is riot a
holder for value unless he has parted with some new con-
sideration, security, or the like.
Although this exact question has never come squarely
before the courts on the question of bills of lading,
yet it seems as if the same rules would govern as in the
case of bills and notes. Thus leaving the question to
be decided according to the jurisdiction where the par-
ticular case arises.
A sale on credit will not render the purchaser one
for value until he pays, but payment in the notes or
bills of a third person, or even of the purchaser, will
be equally good with payment in cash. The mere fact
that goods which are in transitu were bought on credit
and have not beer paid for is, however, no reason why
they should be resold, because this may be the best means
o, obtaining the means to pay, and it may fairly be pre-
sumed that the bill of lading was transmitted to the
purchaser with that view.
An assignee for the benefit of creditors cannot be
considered a holder for value.
We find one or two things in the doctrine of bona
fide holders of bills of lading which are contrary to the
law of bills and notes; and these are, that a bill of la-
ding obtained by fraud, or one stolen or found, is not
free from these defenses in the hands of a bona fide hold-
14.
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er for value. The opposite is true of bills and notes.
It results from the authorities that wheritthe vendor
transfers or endorses the bill of lading to the vendee,
a subsequent purchaser from the latter,,on the faith of
the bill, will stand in the same position as if the goods
had arrived arid been handed over at the time of the pur-
chase. The authorities have sometimes been regarded as
establishing that the endorsement of a bill of lading has
a transcendent operation, arid may even give a title to
goods which the endorser does not own, and has riot been
authorized to sell. A capacity for transfering the
right of property under such circumstances implies that
the instrument to which it belongs is negotiable; and
accordingly, bills of lading have been said to be suscep-
tible of negotiation, not only in text books, but by
judges of no inconsiderable authority. But after a
study of the English cases of the period when promissory
notes and inland bills of exchange took their place in
English law, it will be found that negotiability must
either be conferred by statute or arise from commercial
uasge sanctioned by express decision. In the case of
bills of lading both these sources of authority are want-
16.
ing. But in many States, bills of lading have been made
negotiable by statute, and I know of no better way of
presenting the law of this country as to the extent to
which these statues make bills if lading negotiabla,
than to quote from the opinion of Mr. Justice Strong in
a recent case before the Supreme Court of the United
States. After stating the facts of the case,.Land dis-
cussing the similarity of the statutes of the several
States, he says:
"We must, therefore, look outside of the statutes
to learn what they mean by declaring such instruments
negotiable. WhaT is negotiability? it is a technical
term derived from the usage of merchants and bankers, in
transfering, primarily, bills of exchange, arid afterwards
promissory notes. At common law, no contract was assigr-
able so as to give to an assignee a right to enforce it
by suit in his own name. To this rule bills of exchange
and promissory notes, payable to order or bearer, have
been admitted exceptions, made such by the adoption of
the law merchant. They may be transferred by endorse-
mant and delivery, and such a transfer is called negotia-
tion. It is a merchantile business transaction, and the
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capability of being thus transferred, so as to give to
the indorsee a right to sue on the contract in his own
name, is what constitutesrrnegotiability. The term "ne-
gotiable" expresses, at least primarily, this mode and
effect of a transfer.
"In regard to bills and notes, certain other conse-
quences generally, though riot always, follow. Such as
a liability of the indorser, if demand be duly made of
the acceptor or maWer and reasonable notice of his de-
fault be given. So if the indorsement be made for value
to a bona fide holder before the maturity of the bill or
note, in due course of business, the maker or acceptor
cannot set up against the indorsee any defense which
might have been set up against the payee had the bill or
note remained in his hands. So also, if a note or bill
of exchange be indorsed in blank, if payable to order, or
if payable to bearer, and therefore negotiable by deliv-
ery alone, and then be lost or stolen, a bona fide pur-
chaser for value paid acquires title to it, even as
against the true owner. This is an exception from the
ordinary rule respecting personal property. But none of
these consequences are necessary attendants or constitu-
18.
ents of negotiability or negotiation. That may exist
without them. A bill or note past due is negotiable, if
it be payable to order or bearer, but its indorsement or
delivery does not cut off the defenses of the maker or
acceptor against it, nor create such a contract as re-
sults from an indorsement before maturity, and it does
not give to the purchaser of a lost or stolen bill, the
rights of the real owner.
"lt does riot necessarily follow, therefore, that be-
cause a statute has made bills if lading negotiable by
indorsement and delivery, all these consequences of the
indorsement and delivery of bills and notes before matur-
ity ensue or intendedto result from such negotiation.
"Bills of exchange and promissory notes are exception-
al in their character. They are representatives of
money, circulating in the commercial world as the evi-
dence of money,"O!P which any person in lawful possession
may avail himself to pay debts or make purchases or make
remittances of money from one country to another, or to
remote places in the same country. Hence, as said by
Story, J.,'it has become a general rule of the commercial
world to hold bills of exchange, as in some sort, sacred
instruments in favor of a bona fide holder for a valu-
able consideration, without notice', Without such a
holding they could not perform their peculiar functions.
It is for this reason that it is held that if a bill or
note indorsed in blank, or payable to bearer, be lost or
stolen, and be purchased from the finder or thief, with-
out any knowledge of want of ownership in the vendor, the
bona fide purchaser may hold it against the true owner.
He may hold it though he took it negligently, and when
there were suspicious circumstances attending the trans-
fer. Nothing short of actual or constructive notice
that the instrument is not the property of the person who
offers to sell it, that is, nothing short of mala fides
will defeat his right. The rule is the same as that
which protects the bona fide indorser of a bill or note
purchased for value from the true owner. The purchaser
is not bound to look beyond the instrument.
"The rule was first applied to the case of a lost
bank note, and put upon the ground that the interests of
trade, the usual course of business, and the fact that
bank notes pass from hand to hand as coin, require it.
It was subsequently held applicable to merchant's drafts,
and later to bills and notes as coming within the same
20 Is
reason.
"The reason can have no application to the case of a
lost or stolen bill of lading. The function of that
instrument is entirely different from that of a bill or
note. It is not a representative of money, used for
transmission of money, or for the payment of debts, or
for purchases. It does not pass from hand to hand as
bank notes or coin. It is a contract for the performance
of a certain duty. True, it is a symbol of ownership of
the goods covered by it.-- A representative of those
goods. But if the goods themselves be lost or stolen,
no sale of them by the finder or thief, though to a bona
fide purchaser for value, will divest the ownership of
the person who lost them, or from whom they were stolen.
Why, then, should a sale of the symbol, a mere represen-
tative of the goods, have such an effect? It may be
that the true owner by his negligence or carelessness may
have put it in the power of a finder or thief tooccupy
ostensibly the position of a true owner; and his care-
lessness may estop him from asserting his right against a
purchaser who has been misled to his hurt by that care-
lessness.
21.
"Bills of lading are regarded as so much cotton,
grain, corn, iron, or other articles of merchandise.
The merchandise is very often sold or pledged by the
transfer of the bills which cover it. They are, in
commerce, a very different thing from bills of exchange
and promissory notes, answering a different purpose, and
performing different functions. It cannot be, therefore
that the statute which made them negotiable by indorse-
ment and delivery, or negotiable in the same sense as
bills of exchange and promissory notes are negotiable,
intended to change totally their character, put them in
all respects on the footing of instruments which are rep-
resentatives of money, and charge the negotiation of them
with all the consequenees which usually attend or follow
the negotiation of bills or notes. Some of those con-
sequences would be very strange if not impossible.
Such as the liability of indorsers, the duty of demand
ad diem, notice of non-delivery by the carrier, etc., or
the loss of the owners property by the fraudulent assign-
ment of a thief. If these were intended, surely, the
statute would have said something more than merely make
them negotiable by indorsement. No statute is to be
22.
construed as altering the common law farther than its
words import. It is nnt to be construed as making any
innovation upon the cormnon law which it does not fairly
expresw. Especially is so great an innovation as would
be placing bills of lading on the same footing in all
respects with bills of exchange, not to be inferred from
words that can be fully satisfied without it."
Thus we see that although bills of lading possess
many of the characteristics of negotiable instruments,
and are even declared to be such by statute in some
States, yet the courts are not inclined to hold them ne-
gotiable in the full sense of the word. The most that
can be said of them is that they are quasi-negotiable.
A question that has frequently cone before the
courts for decision is as to the effect of the recitals
in a bill of lading, whether they are conclusive against
the carrier, and if so, to what extent.
As we have seen,these recitals are open to explana-
tion as between the original parties, but become conclu-
sive when the bill has passed into the hands of a bona
fide holder for value. But the conclusiveness of the
recital in such a case will only,extend to those matters
23.
which can be said to have been known by the carrier, that
is, they extend to external indications as to goods re-
ceived. If the bill says "wet" or "dry", if it says "in
good order", if it says of such a kind or quality, a
third person knows that they appeared so to the carrier
when they were received. They purported to be so and so,
that is, to all matters which the carrier had the oppor-
tunity of ascertaining, all the external indications of
the property given to the carrier for carriage, these re-
citals are true; but as to secret matters, as to matters
which could not be discovered in the ordinary course of
things by the carrier, these recitals will not be con-
elusive, because, under these circumstances, there is,no
representation made that these facts are within his know.-
edge.
Frequently a carrier seeks to limit or vary his li-
ability in this regard by adding to,the description, "cor+
tents unknown". There is usually a printed clause,
"contents unknown", followed by a description of the con-
tents. The general rule that written words are to be
followed rather than printed ones, when there is a con-
flict, only applies when there is such repugnancy between
24.
them that they cannot be reconciled; but in this case
they can be reconciled.
There is another way in which the carrier may vary
the effect of these recitals as against third parties,
and that is by stamping the bill of lading "non-negoti-Jl
able", which is notice to all persons who may subsequent--
ly come into possession of the bill of lading, that he
will claim the same rights that he has against the person
to whom the bill was given. Negotiable is here used in
the popular sense. It means, "I did not intend that
this instrument should pass from hand to hand in the com-
munity." It means, "I made this contract with A., and
will recognize only such rights in his assignee as he has."
In such a case it seems that parol evidence would not be
admissible against the common carrier to vary his liabil-
ity.
There are many more interesting points in the study
of this subject that might be taken up here, but time
will not permit. By a careful study of the cases collec-
ted at the end of this article, the entire history and
development of the law of bills of lading can be obtained.
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